JERUSALEM – The risk of famine will persist throughout Gaza this winter unless fighting stops and more humanitarian aid reaches families, according to a new food security assessment by experts from 16 UN agencies and NGOs. Twelve months of fighting have decimated livelihoods, drastically reduced food production and severely restricted both commercial and humanitarian supply lines, the report said.
The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) snapshot – released today – projects that over the coming months 1.95 million people in Gaza (91 percent of the population) will face acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or worse). The IPC, which uses global, scientific standards to evaluate food insecurity levels, also said that 345,000 people would face Catastrophic levels of hunger (IPC Phase 5), and 876,000 people (41 percent) Emergency levels of hunger (IPC Phase 4).
The report found a marginal reduction in the severity of food insecurity in September-October 2024 compared to the last report issued in June. This was largely attributed to an uptick in humanitarian assistance in North Gaza, Gaza City, Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis governorates between May and August 2024.
This slight improvement will be short-lived, the report warned, due to the ongoing fighting and the sharp reduction of humanitarian and commercial flows since September. This is expected to push most of the population back into severe food insecurity and worsening levels of acute malnutrition during the coming winter.
“No humanitarian food supplies entered northern Gaza in the first two weeks of October, and only a few trucks reached the south and central areas, meaning the situation is likely far worse than what the assessment picked up when data was collected in September,” said Arif Husain, WFP’s Chief Economist. “Commercial supplies are down, there is large-scale displacement, infrastructure is decimated, agriculture has collapsed and people have no money. All this is reflected in the IPC’s projection that the situation will get worse from November onwards.”
Due to a shortage of food supplies, in September, WFP was only able to support half of the families it planned to reach, and with reduced rations. In October, WFP has been unable to conduct any food parcel distributions and supplies for its hot meal kitchens and bread production are running dangerously low.
The IPC report highlights that northern and central Gaza governorates, along with Rafah in the south, face a risk of famine between November 2024 and April 2025 if fighting continues and humanitarian and commercial supply lines remain severely restricted. The ongoing conflict in northern Gaza and Deir al-Balah suggests that the worst-case scenario is plausible, the report warned.
WFP has consistently called for crossing points to be open, bureaucratic impediments to be removed, and law and order to be restored around the crucial Kerem Shalom crossing point in Gaza’s south. It has also called for a halt to fighting to enable WFP and humanitarian agencies to respond adequately to the crisis.
“The small progress we have seen is a signal that the flow of humanitarian and commercial cargo into Gaza was working. But we are now in a very difficult situation. Without safe and sustained access, WFP cannot deliver lifesaving humanitarian assistance at the required scale,” Husain said.
| Risk of Famine (November 2024 – April 2025) |
| The IPC analysis team conducted a risk of Famine analysis for the three units of analysis, which are all characterised by extremely high levels acute food insecurity, with some populations in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) and plausible signs of a further deterioration of the situation.
The analysis concluded that the whole Gaza Strip faces a risk of Famine in the projected period under a worst-case scenario that has a reasonable chance of occurring as described below: Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis: Conflict would intensify in Khan Younis with more frequent and destructive incursions. Deir-al-Balah would be subject to a major offensive, with heavy, protracted ground operations. This would result in a major displacement flow towards the eastern side of both governorates, and south towards Khan Younis and some movement, mostly of returnees, towards Rafah. These movements would be concurrent to the displacement into Deir al- Balah of hundreds of thousands of IDPs from the northern governorates, further constraining the limited capacity of health, nutrition and other services. The increased population density in these governorates would increase the risk of disease outbreaks, as WASH and health systems collapse. Further, the risk of civil unrest would increase due to insufficient provision of humanitarian assistance. North Gaza and Gaza: An escalation and intensification of the hostilities would occur, with higher frequency and duration, resulting in expanded ground operations and increasing levels of destruction and lethality. Evacuation orders would be issued for all civilians in the governorates, leading to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people to the middle governorates. This would also include a complete halt of commercial trucks, following the downward trend already observed recently. Similarly, humanitarian assistance would significantly decrease, to a near halt. Social safety nets would collapse, and civil unrest would likely increase. Rafah: Military offensive would intensify, with continued expansion of the military zone. Rafah may experience increased airstrikes and bombardments. The Rafah border crossing would remain closed, and the trickle of assistance from Kerem Shalom would decrease to nearly zero. Due to increasingly limited food supplies, civil unrest would increases significantly, with a breakdown in law and order, further reducing access to food. Basic services would be completely dysfunctional and supply chains for medical equipment, therapeutic feeding and medicines, would expose the whole population to heightened risks of epidemics. – Information Source: WFP – GAZA STRIP: IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Special Snapshot | September 2024 – April 2025 Published on 17 October 2024 IPC Special Briefs are produced by the IPC global initiative and do not necessarily reflect the views of stakeholders in Palestine. This analysis factors in all data and information available up to 4 October 2024 and does not take into account the latest developments on the ground.
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